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Title VII * Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 0
Disclosure Policy
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Associated Dry Goods Corp.
101 S. Ct. 817 (1981)
n Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Associated Dry Goods
Corp.,' the Supreme Court finally resolved the conflict surrounding the dis-
closure policy of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC)
under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.2 The question before the
Court was whether the prelitigation disclosure of information in a Commis-
sion file to the charging party, the employee, is a "public" disclosure within
the meaning of the statutory restrictions which proscribe disclosure of the
contents of EEOC files.' The Court held that the term "public" under
sections 706(b)' and 709(e)5 of Title VII does not include charging
parties.' Thus, the Commission may release investigative and conciliatory
information obtained from the employer to the aggrieved employee even
before the filing of a lawsuit. Justice Stewart, speaking for the majority,
further narrowed this holding by permitting the EEOC to reveal only the
information found in the charging party's file and prohibiting the release
of information from the files of other parties who have brought claims
against the same employer.'
1 101 S. Ct. 817 (1981).
2Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 701-716, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. H§
2000e - 2000e-17 (1976)).
3 101 S. Ct. at 819.
#Section 706(b) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (1976) states, in relevant part:
Whenever a charge is filed by or on behalf of a person claiming to be aggrieved ...
the Commission shall serve a notice of the charge . . .on such employer . . .within
ten days and shall make an investigation thereof .... Charges shall be in writing
under oath or affirmation and shall contain such information and be in such form
as the Commission requires. Charges shall not be made public by the Commission....
If the Commission determines after such investigation that there is reasonable cause
to believe that the charge is true, the Commission shall endeavor to eliminate by
informal methods of conference, conciliation, and persuasion. Nothing said or done
during and as a part of such informal endeavors may be made public by the Com-
mission, its officers or employees, or used as evidence in a subsequent proceeding
without the written consent of the persons concerned. Any person who makes public
information in violation of this subsection shall be fined not more than $1,000 or
imprisoned for not more than one year, or both.
5 Section 709(e) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-8(e) (1976) states:
It shall be unlawful for any officer or employee of the Commission to make
public in any manner whatever any information obtained by the Commission pursuant
to its authority under this section prior to the institution of any proceeding under
this subchapter involving such information. Any officer or employee of the Com-
mission who shall make public in any manner whatever any information in violation
of this subsection shall be guilty, of a misdemeanor and upon conviction thereof, shall
be fined not more than $1,000, or imprisoned not more than one year.
6 101 S. Ct. at 822.
7 1d, at 825.
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The case arose over the enforcement of an EEOC subpoena. Between
1971 and 1973, seven employees filed discrimination charges against their
employer, the Joseph Home Company, a division of the respondent, As-
sociated Dry Goods Corporation, and the EEOC sought pertinent evidence.8
Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b), the Commission began investigating
the charges by serving interrogatories on Home which requested statistical
information relating to personnel practices.' Home refused to answer the
interrogatories without assurance from the EEOC that the answers would
not be disclosed to the charging parties or their attorneys.' The Com-
mission refused such assurance and stated that its policy was to disclose
to charging parties both their own case files and related case files of other
parties." Home continued to withhold the requested information and the
Commission subpoenaed the material. When the Commission rejected Home's
petition for revocation of the subpoena, respondent filed this suit in the
district court 2 asking that the Commission's limited disclosure practices
be declared invalid under Title VII and that the Commission be enjoined
from enforcing its subpoena. 3
The district court held that the Commission's disclosure of confidential
information to charging parties violated the Title VII scheme of negotiation
and settlement and would encourage private litigation." The provisions
in the EEOC Compliance Manual governing special disclosures" were
found invalid and the district court enforced the subpoena on the condition
that the Commission treat charging parties as part of the "public" to whom
A Id. at 820.
9As amended in 1972, Title VII contemplates a two-step process. First, upon receiving
complaints of discrimination against an employer, the EEOC conducts an investigation to
determine whether probable cause exists. The EEOC was given broad subpoena power enabling
it to obtain information regarding the general employment practices of the employer. Upon a
finding of probable cause, the EEOC enters into negotiations with the. employer seeking
possible remedies. If the negotiations fail, then the Commission may file suit. Employees
also have a right to file suit 180 days after filing a complaint with the Commission if no
conciliation has been reached, or within 90 days after the Commission's notice that it
will not file suit. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1-2000e-17 (1976).
10 101 S. Ct. at 820.
21 Id. at n. 3. The Court referred to the general disclosure policy of the Commission
which provides that neither the charge nor information obtained pursuant to § 709 of
Title VII shall be made public. However, earlier disclosures are allowed to charging parties,
their attorneys or witnesses "where disclosure is deemed necessary for securing appropriate
relief." 29 C.F.R. § 1601.22 (1978).
'
2 Associated Dry Goods Corp. v. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n, 454 F. Supp. 387
(E.D. Va. 1978).
13454 F. Supp. at 389.
14454 F. Supp. at 391. The District Court felt that the EEOC's primary statutory duty
was to "attempt conciliation" and that private lawsuits would hinder such attempts. See,
Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n, 581 F.2d 941 (D.C. Cir.
1978).
15See 1 EEOC COMPL. MAN. (BNA) §§ 83.3, 83.5 (1979).
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information from the files could not be disclosed.1" The court of appeals
affirmed the district court's judgment."
The Supreme Court's decision resolved a conflict that has split the
federal circuit courts and the EEOC into opposite camps over the question
of whether aggrieved employees are members of the "public" for purposes
of Title Vil's confidentiality provisions.18 The Fifth Circuit held in H. Kess-
ler & Co. v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission9 that an em-
ployee and his attorney could obtain investigative information prior to
filing suit. Stressing the importance of the private litigant, Kessler found
the open disclosure policy of revealing the identity of the parties and the
information obtained during the EEOC investigation consistent with the lan-
guage of Title VII and its legislative history." Five years later, in Sears, Roe-
buck & Co. v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission,2 ' the District of
Columbia Circuit distinguished and rejected Kessler and denied Sears employ-
ees access to investigative information until after suit had been filed. The
Seventh Circuit in Burlington Northern, Inc. v. Equal Employment Oppor-
tunity Commision22 followed Sears and restricted claimant access to EEOC
fies. Burlington further held that a charging party could obtain only such in-
vestigatory information as is "directly relevant '25 to his particular claim. The
Fourth Circuit, in the companion to the present case, Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission v. Joseph Home Co.,24 agreed with Sears and Bur-
lington25 and denied the charging employee access to Commission information
until after a suit has been initiated.
Amid judicial turmoil, the EEOC developed procedural guidelines
to best effectuate its interpretation of Title VII policies. The Commission's
procedural regulations" permit the disclosure of the investigative files of
the individual and of individuals with similar charges against the same
employer even before a lawsuit has been filed. However, the EEOC has
been forced to restrict access to its files in those jurisdictions which follow
18 454 F. Supp. at 390-391.
27 Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. Joseph Home Co., 607 F.2d 1075 (4th Cir.
1979).
28 See Comment, Disclosure of E.E.O.C. Files to Title VII Litigants, 54 N.Y.U. L. REv.
1013 (1979); Comment, Access to E.E.O.C. Files Concerning Private Employers, 46 U.
Cm. L. R. 477 (1978); Comment, The Meaning of "Public" in Section 709(e) of the 1964
Civil Rights Act and Access to Information Gathered by the E.E.O.C., 67 KY. L. J. 430
(1978-79).
19 472 F.2d 1147 (5th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied 412 U.S. 939 (1973).
2id. at 1152.
21 581 F.2d 941, 947-948 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
22 582 F.2d 1097, 1100-1101 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied 440 U.S. 930 (1979).
23 Id. at 1101.
24 607 F.2d 1075 (4th Cir. 1979).
25 Id. at 1077.
26See 29 C.F.R. §§ 1601.22 and 1610.17(d); 1 EEOC COWL. MAN. (BNA) § 83 (1979).
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Sears while maintaining a more liberal disclosure policy in the remaining
jurisdictions."
In an attempt to reconcile these decisions, Justice Stewart looked
first to the language of Title VII and to the procedures and policies of
the EEOC and stressed the balance between Title VII's "administrative
and judicial means of eliminating employment discrimination." ' While
recognizing the role of the Commission in conciliation attempts, the Court
also found that "Title VII makes private lawsuits by aggrieved employees
an important part of its means of enforcement." ' The Court rejected the
Sears and Burlington decisions which were premised upon a concept of
private litigation as the "ugly stepchild" in the Title VII scheme."0
The Court next examined the language of Title VII, section 706(b)
which states that "charges shall not be made public."31 Justice Stewart rea-
soned that since both the employee and the employer are well aware of the
charges, then the term "public" cannot logically include these parties.3 2
The Court argued that for the sake of symmetry the-same "public" in
section 709(e) also must not include the parties to the agency proceeding."
This argument for symmetry, however, ignored the important differ-
ences between sections 709(e) and 706(b) of Title VII.11 The section
709(e) ban on disclosure primarily protects investigative file information.
The EEOC has the power to subpoena the information it requests and,
though employer cooperation is helpful, it is not essential to the EEOC's
exercise of its investigatory power." Once an employee files suit, then all
of the investigatory information can be released and used as evidence in
the employee's lawsuit."' Therefore, section 709(e) merely delays the
release of suit information which the employee eventually will obtain.
27 See text accompanying notes 21-24, supra.
28 101 S. Ct. at 820.
29 Id. at 821.
80See Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. Joseph Home Co., 607 F.2d 1075, 1079
(4th Cir. 1979) (Hall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
31 100 S. Ct. at 822.
82 Id.
83 Although reaching different results, the Kessler and Sears courts both expressed the
view that in the interest of symmetry the term "public" should be given a consistent deflini-
tion throughout the various sections of Title VII. In Kessler the Fifth Circuit held that it
would be "anomalous" to give different meanings to the three instances of identical language
in the same statute. 472 F.2d at 1151. In Sears, the District of Columbia Circuit spoke of
the symmetry of §§ 709(e) and 706(b) and argued that the same policy of non-disclosure
should apply to both. 581 F.2d at 948.
84 See the district court opinion in Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Equal Employment Opportunity
Comm'n, 435 F. Supp. 751, 756 (D.D.C. 1977); Comment, The Meaning of "Public" in
Section 709(e) of the 1967 Civil Rights Act and Access to Information Gathered by the
EEOC, 67 Ky. L. J. 430, 431 n.11 (1978-1979); Comment, Disclosure of EEOC Files to
Title VII Litigants, 54 N.Y. U. L. REv. 1013, 1024 (1979),
35 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-8(a) (1976), which gives the EEOC the right to inspect and copy
any relevant evidence in the hands of the party being investigated.
86.See supra note 5, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-8(e) (1976).
[Vol. 15:2
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In contrast, the section 706(b) ban on disclosure exists for the pro-
tection of conciliatory information and is essential to the performance
of the EEOC's conciliatory function. The conciliation ban permanently bars
the evidentiary use of file information in a trial "without the written con-
sent of the persons concerned. ' 37 The protection afforded conciliation file
information is designed to facilitate a free and open negotiating atmos-
phere.3" Since participation in the conciliation process is entirely voluntary,
the EEOC has no power to require the submission of any statistical data
during the course of discussions,"9 as it may when investigating charges
under section 709(e). Most certainly, the employer would be reluctant to
compile information for the Commission if the employee could subsequently
use this same information in a lawsuit against the employer. Under the
threat of disclosure employers might simply refuse to cooperate with the
EEOC.
Justice Stewart recognized the importance of limiting the disclosure
of investigative information to parties so that unnecessary litigation may
be avoided. The Court contended that the Commission could force the
hand of the parties by disclosing certain information to enable the parties
to better evaluate their own strengths and weaknesses. In effect, this would
enhance the Commission's ability to negotiate between the parties." On
the other hand, the Court pointed to the position of the impecunious em-
ployee, unable to obtain prelitigation investigative information by way of
his own limited resources.' When forced to agree to a Commission set-
tlement, the employee is in the difficult position of having to waive his
right to file suit without knowing the essential facts of the Commission's
investigations.,"
The Court, however, refused to acknowledge the need for the volun-
tary exchange of information vital to the conciliation proceedings between
the EEOC and the employer. From its inception in 1965, Title VII en-
forcement has depended largely upon informal conciliation and negotiation
proceedings between the EEOC and the private employer." This emphasis
was reinforced by the 1972 amendments which granted the EEOC power
to file suit against the employer and prohibited the aggrieved employee from
ST See supra note 4, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (1976).
38 See Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n, 435 F. Supp. 751,
759 (D.C. 1977), aff'd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, and remanded, 581 F.2d 941
(D.C. Cir. 1978).
39See supra note 4, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (1976). During the initial stages, the proceedings
are "informal."
40 101 S. Ct. at 824.
"4I d., n. 19.
'4Id., n. 18.
See Comment, Access to EEOC Files Concerning Private Employers, 46 U. Cm. L. Rv.
477, 488 (1978) (citing Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 44 (1974)).
Fall, 198 1] RECENT CASES
5
Wittenauer: Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Associated Dry Goods Corp.
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1982
AKRON LAW REVIEW
filing suit until 180 days after filing charges with the Commission." The
protection afforded conciliation file information is of vital importance in
facilitating open negotiations. For the sake of symmetry, the Court has
avoided a distinction between sections 706(b) and 709(e) that would allow
the exchange of information and at the same time promote full disclosure
during conciliation.
The Court attempted to evaluate the limited legislative history of Title
VII and its disclosure restraints in support of its position on disclosure."
Citing the comments of Senator Humphrey," a co-sponsor of the bill,
Justice Stewart contended that the disclosure provisions were applicable
only to the general public, not to the charging parties. The remarks of
Senator Humphrey pertain to the section 706 (b) prohibition on making
public the actual "charges" of discrimination. ' 7 As noted by the Court,
the parties themselves will already be aware of the charges. For purposes
of the confidentiality provisions, however, the Senator's rather ambiguous
statement does not readily apply to investigative and conciliatory infor-
mation. Neither comments of Senator Humphrey nor of any other Con-
gressman actually discussed the scope of these provisions."
Justice Stewart also relied on congressional silence to buttress his
argument that Congress could have amended Title VII if it were dissatis-
fied with the Commission's disclosure policy."9 However, this silence may
also be interpreted as an indication that Congress intended strict applica-
tion of its non-disclosure provisions and that only following an express
intent to amend its provisions would disclosure be allowed.
The Court upheld the Kessler rationale and allowed disclosure of sec-
tions 706(b) and 709(e) information, while at the same time, narrowed
this holding so that information in the files of other employees with charges
against the same employer could not be released." According to the
EEOC Compliance Manual, materials from other case files can be released to
an aggrieved employee once certain confidential information and names have
been expunged. 1 Using the same legislative history and statutory analysis,
4 See supra note 9.
45 101 S. Ct. at 822.
4" Senator Humphrey stated, "This is a ban on publicizing and not on such disclosure as is
necessary to the carrying out of the Commission's duties under the statute . . . . The
amendment is not intended to hamper Commission investigations . . . but rather is aimed
at the making available to the general public of unproven charges." 110 CoNG. REc. 12723
(1964) (emphasis added by the Court at 101 S. Ct. at 823).
47 101 S. Ct. at 823.
4"See, Comment, Access to EEOC Files Concerning Private Employers, 46 U. Cm. L. REv.
477-484 (1978).
49 101 S. Ct. at 823, n. 17. The decision noted that Congress had declined to make any-
thing but minor changes in the disclosure rules in its 1972 amendments to Title VII. The Court
contended that this reveals Congressional approval of Commission activity.
50 d. at 825.
'
1 See, 1 EEOC COMPL. MAN. (BNA) § 83.7(c) (1979).
[Vol. :15:2
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Justice Stewart found that "there is no reason why the charging party should
know the content of any other employee's charge, and he must be considered
a member of the public with respect to charges fied by other people. With
respect to all files other than his own, he is a stranger."52 However, the
Court further found that "statistics and other information about an em-
ployer's general practices" may be placed in full or in summary form in
each individual's file.5" What the Court has taken away with one hand
it has given with the other. The employee will still be entitled to see valuable
statistical information that in effect has been gathered from the files of
other employees.
Justice Blackmun, concurring in part and dissenting in part, reasoned
that the Commission should be required to justify any disclosure by dem-
onstrating that such is "necessary to carry out its duties."5 This practical
approach would allow limited disclosure so that the Commission could
more effectively attempt to settle charges. However, Justice Blackmun
refused to agree with the majority in its handling of the dispute over dis-
closure of information to parties who are contemplating litigation. Looking
to the language of Title VII, Justice Blackmun found no statutory authority
which supported allowing the charging parties access to case files as a
means of evaluating their position before filing a lawsuit. 5
Justice Stevens dissented on the grounds that the disclosure of in-
vestigative information to the charging parties was tantamount to dis-
closing such information to the public.56 The dissent pointed to the absence
of a statutory sanction against charging parties for disclosing EEOC in-
formation. According to the EEOC Compliance Manual, the parties agree
to sign form 167, which prohibits further disclosure, before the information
will be released.5" However, there are no provisions in the Manual for en-
forcement of this agreement nor any penalty for its breach. The dissent
asserted that the parties remain free to disclose the information to whom-
ever they please and remarked that "it seems fanciful to me that Congress
intended to prohibit direct disclosure while permitting indirect disclosure." '
Justice Stevens stated that if Congress had intended the parties to be ex-
cluded from the term "public", then it would have provided sanctions
against their release of information, similar to those provided against the
Commissioners.59 Justice Stevens contended that the Court misconstrued
the plain meaning of the Statute.
52 101 S. Ct. at 825.
U Id.
54 Id. at 826 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
55 Id.
56 Id. at 826-27 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
57 See 1 EEOC COMPL. MAN. (BNA) § 83.4 (1979).
58 101 S. Ct. at 826 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
59 Id. at 827.
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CONCLUSION
The Court's decision in Associated Dry Goods acts as a reaffirmation
of the Fifth Circuit's decision in Kessler. While an open disclosure policy
has been adopted, the EEOC will have to restrict the access of related em-
ployee files to aggrieved individual employees. The Court expressed concern
with the importance of the private right of action under Title VII, where
the charging party acts as a "private attorney general"6 whose purpose
is to further effectuate the ban on employment discrimination. However,
the balance between administrative and judicial functions of the EEOC
may have been disrupted by the army of "attorney generals" which the
Court has enlisted. With full disclosure of conciliatory information, the
individual employee wields a powerful weapon. The effectiveness of this
weapon eventually may be eliminated, however, if employers refuse to
cooperate with the EEOC in voluntarily providing the ammunition of sta-
tistical information during prelitigation conciliation and negotiation attempts.
KENNETH WITTENAUER
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
Container Legislation e Equal Protection * Commerce Clause
Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Company, 101 S. Ct. 715 (1981)
T HE PROBLEMS of litter, solid waste, and natural resource depletion are
often inexorably linked to the liquid manufacturing and packaging
industry. Legislative efforts to ameliorate these problems may therefore
involve various controls of containers.' When states enact container legis-
lation, however, terms must be carefully chosen to avoid conflict with both
state and federal constitutions.!
In Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co.,' the United States Supreme
Court struck down an equal protection challenge to state legislation banning
certain containers in the milk industry. The Court's approach to this chal-
lenge is striking; equally significant is the Court's departure from its usual
o Id. at 824.
1 See generally Greef & Martin, Beverage Container Legislation: A Policy and Constitutional
Evaluation, 52 TEx. L. REv. 351 (1974).
2 The most frequent challenges involve claimed violations of the Due Process, Equal Pro-
tection and Commerce clauses.
3101 S. CL 715 (1981).
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